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Experimental realization of secure multi-party computation
in an entanglement access network
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To construct a quantum network with many end users, it is critical to have a cost-efficient way
to distribute entanglement over different network ends. We demonstrate an entanglement access
network, where the expensive resource, the entangled photon source at the telecom wavelength and
the core communication channel, is shared by many end users. Using this cost-efficient entanglement
access network, we report experimental demonstration of a secure multiparty computation protocol,
the privacy-preserving secure sum problem, based on the network quantum cryptography.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac,03.67.Hk,03.67.Bg,42.50.Ex
The peculiar quantum correlation, entanglement, pro-
vides the crucial resource for quantum information pro-
cessing [1–3]. Generation of remote entanglement is a key
step for quantum communication and distributed compu-
tation [4, 5]. Distribution of entanglement in a multiple-
end quantum network is costly through the point-to-
point protocol as one needs to establish an entanglement
source and a quantum communication channel between
each end [4–10]. We demonstrate a cost-efficient entan-
glement access network where multiple end users share
the same entanglement source and the core communi-
cation channel. We verify entanglement and quantum
nonlocality between different end users. Using this en-
tanglement access network, we report the experimental
demonstration of a secure multi-party computation pro-
tocol where several end users compute cooperatively to
solve a joint problem without revealing the information of
their actual inputs [11–13]. This demonstration opens up
the prospect of applying the cost-efficient entanglement
access network for achieving secure multi-party compu-
tation that protects the privacy of end users.
With popularity of the internet, distributed computa-
tion becomes increasingly more important, where a num-
ber of end users need to work cooperatively to solve a
common problem. The answer to the problem typically
depends on the inputs of all the end users, which need to
be communicated in the network. At the same time, the
users need to protect their privacy and do not want to re-
veal their information to the others. Secure multi-party
computation is a branch of cryptography and computer
science that studies this kind of problems [11–13]. A well-
known primitive example of this field is the millionaire
problem, first introduced by Yao [11], in which two mil-
lionaires want to know which of them is richer without
revealing their actual wealth. Secure multi-party com-
putation has many applications in e-commerce and data
mining where people need to compare numbers which are
confidential [11–13]. Classically, the secure multi-party
computation protocols typically rely on computational-
ly hard mathematical problems, which require specific
assumptions and are subject to security loopholes in par-
ticular under attack by a quantum computer [13].
In this paper, we demonstrate an entanglement ac-
cess network which offers an alternative route for secure
multi-party computation based on the network quantum
cryptography. Quantum access network is a concept in-
troduced in a recent paper where the expensive quantum
resource is shared by many end users [8, 9]. For quan-
tum key distribution based on the BB84 protocol [14],
the photon detector is the relatively expensive part of its
implementation and thus shared in the quantum access
network demonstrated in Ref. [8]. Here, we realize an
entanglement access network to efficiently distribute en-
tanglement between network end users. In this network,
the entanglement source is the most expensive part of
the implementation and thus shared between many end
users. Entanglement provides the crucial quantum re-
source for achieving device-independent quantum cryp-
tography, the most secure way for cryptographic com-
munication [15–20]. Entanglement is also the critical re-
source for certified generation of shared randomness [21],
and for quantum communication and multi-party compu-
tation through the entanglement-based schemes [3, 22].
We demonstrate an entanglement access network which
efficiently distributes entanglement between a number of
end users connected through fibers of more than 20 km
length by sharing a single entangled photon source at
the telecom frequency. By use of this entanglement ac-
cess network, we report experimental demonstration of
a secure multi-party computation protocol, the secure
sum problem, in which several millionaires want to know
how much money they have in total but none of them
is willing to reveal his wealth to others [11, 12]. This
demonstration shows that the entanglement access net-
work provides a cost-efficient way to realize a quantum
network with shared resource, opening up the prospect
for its applications in secure multi-party cryptography
and distributed quantum computation.
The entangled photon source shown in Fig. 1(a) is
generated by a type-II BBO crystal pumped by ultrafast
laser pulses (with the pulse duration less than 150 fs and
a repetition rate of 76 MHz) at the wavelength of 775
2nm from a Ti:Sapphire laser. The spontaneous paramet-
ric down conversion in the BBO crystal produces entan-
gled photon pairs at the telecom wavelength of 1550 nm,
which, in the ideal case, are in the polarization entan-
gled state |Ψ〉 = (|HV 〉+ eiϕ |V H〉) /√2, where |H〉 and
|V 〉 denote respectively the horizontal and the vertical
polarization state and ϕ is a controllable phase [23]. We
have verified that the experimentally generated state ρ
has an entanglement fidelity Fs of (95.12± 0.25)% with
respect to this ideal state |Ψ〉 through the quantum state
tomography [24].
The entangled photons at the telecom frequency are
coupled into optical fibers representing the core commu-
nication channel with the total distance about 20 km.
The output photons from the fibers are fed into a 1 × 8
optical switch at each side (called Alice’s and Bob’s side)
which is electrically controlled by the computer to deliver
the photons to one of the eight output ports according to
the electric control signal. This forms an entanglement
access network with 8× 8 possible choices of pairs of end
users who can share entangled photons with the entangle-
ment distance more than 20 km, as shown in Fig. 1(b).
All the end users share the same entanglement source
and the core communication channel. The polarization
states of photons are subject to tension and tempera-
ture dependent rotations in the optical fibers which are
carefully compensated afterwards through the fiber po-
larization controllers.
To demonstrate entanglement between different end
users, we randomly choose two users A1 and A2 at
Alice’s side and two users B1 and B2 at Bob’s side.
For the four pairs of end users AiBj (i, j = 1, 2), we
measure their entanglement by detecting the photon co-
incidences in different polarization bases. To rotate
the polarization basis, we use a fast switchable elec-
tric optical modular (EOM), which induces a polariza-
tion transformation |H〉 → cos θ |H〉 − i sin θ |V 〉 and
|V 〉 → −i sin θ |H〉+cos θ |V 〉 with the angle θ determined
by the computer controlled electric signal. The output H
and V polarized photons are split by a polarization beam
splitter (PBS) and then detected through single photon
counters. In the Z (or X) basis detection, we register the
photon coincidence counts by fixing the angle θA of Ai at
0o (or 45o) and rotating the angle θB of Bj . The result-
ing coincidence counts as functions of the angle θB are
shown in Fig. 2 for different pairs AiBj . The big contrast
of these oscillations is a clear demonstration of quantum
entanglement. Quantitatively, we calculate the visibili-
ties of these oscillation curves Vz and Vx in the Z and the
X basis, respectively, and the entanglement fidelity Fe is
then bounded by Fe ≥ (Vz + Vx)/2 [25]. The visibilities
and the corresponding fidelity bounds are listed in Fig.
3. All the pairs have the entanglement fidelity higher
than 90%. The small decrease of the entanglement fideli-
ty compared with the fidelity Fs of the entangled photon
source is due to the imperfection in compensation of the
polarization rotation in the optical fibers.
The shared entanglement allows demonstration of
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FIG. 1. The experimental setup for implementa-
tion of an entanglement access network. (a) The setup
to generate the polarized entangled photons at the telecom
wavelength. The ultrafast pulse at the 775 nm wavelength
from the Ti:Sapphire laser is H-polarized and focused by lens
onto the BBO crystal cut in the Type-II phase-matching con-
dition, generating polarized entangled photons at the 1550
nm wavelength. To ensure entanglement, we use a compen-
sator made by another BBO crystal at each output, which
compensates the temporal walk-off between the H and V po-
larized photons in the nonlinear crystal. The output photons
are filtered by 3 nm interference filters and then coupled into
long-distance optical fibers with a fiber coupler. The half-
wave plates (HWP) are used for alignment of the polarization
axes before and after the fibers. (b) The setup to construct an
entanglement access network , where the entanglement source
and the core communication channel are shared by many end
users. Computer controlled optical switches are used to dis-
tribute the entangled photons to different end users. Our ex-
periment demonstrates an entanglement access network with
up to 8 × 8 end users, where the two sides are separated by
a fiber about 20 km. Among the end users, we have verified
entanglement and quantum nonlocality between four pairs of
them and used the shared entanglement to demonstrate the
four-party secure sum protocol as an example to illustrate its
application for implementation of secure multi-party compu-
tation.
quantum key distribution between any pair of the end
users in this network using the Ekert protocol [2]. For
this purpose, we need to randomly choose the angle
θA from the set {0o, 22.5o, 45o} and θB from the set
{22.5o, 45o, 67.5o}, and record the individual measure-
ment outcomes for each coincidence count [26]. From
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FIG. 2. The entanglement demonstrated between
different pairs of the end users. The figures show the co-
incidence counts when we fix the rotation angle of the electric
optical modulator (EOM) of one end at 0o (for the Z-basis)
or 45o (for the X-basis) while rotating the angle of the EOM
at the other end. Different sub-figures correspond to different
pairs of parties (A1 and B1, A1 and B2, A2 and B1, A2 and
B2). The visibilities of the oscillations in the X and the Z
bases together bound the entanglement fidelity of the pho-
tonic states shared between the corresponding parties.
the counts for the angles θA = {0o, 45o} and θB =
{22.5o, 67.5o}, we calculate the expectation value of the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) observable 〈S〉 =
〈0o, 22.5o〉+ 〈45o, 22.5o〉+ 〈45o, 67.5o〉 − 〈0o, 67.5o〉 [27],
where 〈θA, θB〉 denotes the photon coincidence counts
with θA, θB at the specified values. The CHSH values
are listed in Fig. 3 for different pairs Ai, Bj . The CHSH
inequality 〈S〉 ≤ 2 for any classical correlation is clearly
violated, demonstrating quantum nonlocality. The sig-
nificant violation of the CHSH inequality for each pair
of the end users is a guarantee of the security of the
entangled-based QKD protocol [15–20]. To generate
quantum key, the measurement outcomes at θA = θB =
{22.5o, 45o} are kept, which yield the sifted keys [26].
For each pair of the parties, we obtain roughly 1.2× 104
sifted keys. We randomly choose 20% of the keys to
estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER). For our
data, the QBER γ is about 5%, smaller than the securi-
ty threshold of 11% [20]. We use the low density parity
check (LDPC) code [28, 29] to do the error correction for
the sifted keys, which is more efficient compared with the
conventional CASCADE protocol [26]. We obtain about
8000 error-free shared keys, which are then purified by
the privacy amplification protocol via a universal-2-class
hash function [30], yielding about 1800 shared secret final
keys. The residual information available to any potential
eavesdroppers is reduced by a factor of 2−300 during the
privacy amplification and thus much less than one bit.
We now use the entanglement access network to
demonstrate a secure multi-party computation protocol:
the privacy-preserving secure sum problem [12]. The
Z basis visibility X basis visibility Fidelity bound CHSH Value
A1B1 (91.68?0.21)% (88.76 ?0.32)% (90.22?0.26)% 2.428?0.020 
A1B2 (92.59?0.19)% (88.11 ?0.30)% (90.35?0.24)% 2.449?0.019 
A2B1 (94.10?0.18)% (87.91 ?0.36)% (91.01?0.27)% 2.453?0.020 
A2B2 (93.54?0.16)% (86.73 ?0.32)% (90.14?0.24)% 2.458?0.021 
FIG. 3. The experimental data to show entangle-
ment and quantum nonlocality shared between dif-
ferent parties. The table lists the oscillation visibilities of
the coincidence counts in the Z and the X bases, whose av-
erage gives a lower bound to the entanglement fidelity (the
fourth column). The error bars are obtained by assuming a
Poissionian distribution for the photon counts and propagated
from the measured coincidence counts to the quantities list-
ed in the table through exact Monte Carlo simulation. The
last column of the table shows the measured value for the
CHSH observable, and a larger-than-2 value indicates viola-
tion of the Bell inequality, demonstrating quantum nonlocal-
ity shared between the corresponding parties.
problem can be illustrated with the following example:
assume several millionaires want to know how much mon-
ey they have in total, but none of them want to reveal
his actual wealth to others. To be concrete, we consider
the case of four parties A1, A2, B1, B2. Denote by a1, a2,
b1 and b2 the input from A1, A2, B1, B2, respectively.
We want to calculate the sum T = a1 + a2 + b1 + b2
without revealing the inputs a1, a2, b1, b2. The quantum
protocol to accomplish this task using the entanglement
access network goes as follows:
Step 1.—Using the entanglement-based network QKD,
A1 and B1, B1 and A2, A2 and B2, and B2 and A1 share
random keys of n bits denoted by Ra1b1 , Ra2b1 , Ra2b2 ,
and Ra1b2 , respectively. The number of bits n is taken
to be at least as large as the estimated number of bits
for the sum T .
Step 2.—A1 calculates X1 = a1 + Ra1b1 − Ra1b2 and
publicly announces X1 to others; B1 calculates X2 =
b1+Ra2b1 −Ra1b1 and publicly announces X2 to others;
A2 calculates X3 = a2 +Ra2b2 −Ra2b1 and publicly an-
nounces X3 to others; B2 calculates X4 = b2 +Ra1b2 −
Ra2b2 and publicly announces X4 to others.
Step 3.—All of them know the sum T by calculating
T = X1 +X2 +X3 +X4. At the same time, the inputs
a1, a2, b1, b2 remain confidential to the other parties as
the public information Xi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) has no corre-
lation with the inputs due to the one-time pad theorem.
For security of this secure sum protocol, we have assumed
that different parties do not collaborate to steal the input
information of the other parties. With the sum T , when
a few parties collaborate, it is always possible to reveal
the input information of the other party.
In the experimental demonstration, as an example,
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FIG. 4. The experimental demonstration of the four-
party secure-sum protocol through the entanglement
access network. The top four sub-figures show the pub-
lically announced data from each of the four parties for 30
rounds of experiments for demonstration of the same secure-
sum problem with the same input from each party. The ran-
domly distributed data over different experimental runs is an
indication that the announced data reveal no information of
the input from each party. The last sub-figure shows the
secure sum calculated by each party from the publically an-
nounced data, which is identical for different experimental
runs and always equal to the true value of the sum for the
underlying problem.
we take randomly generated numbers a1 = 55406,
b1 = 116559, a2 = 988150 and b2 = 2839885. We
run the above implementation of the secure sum pro-
tocol 30 times, and for each time we use different keys
Ra1b1 ,Ra2b1 ,Ra2b2 ,Ra1b2 with the number of bits n = 25
bits to encode the public informationX1, X2, X3, X4. For
these 30 experimental runs, the publicly announced num-
bers X1, X2, X3, X4 are shown in Fig. 4, which look com-
pletely random from trial to trial and reveal no informa-
tion of the inputs a1, a2, b1, b2. However, for each run,
their sum is always fixed to be 4 × 106, which gives the
correct calculation result for T = a1 + a2 + b1 + b2.
Similar to the quantum access network realized recent-
ly [8], we expect that the entanglement access network
demonstrated in this paper provides a source-efficient
way for network cryptography and secure multi-party
computation. In particular, the shared entanglement be-
tween each ends of the network opens up the possibility to
realize device independent quantum cryptography [15–
19], which allows most secure communication by closing
the practical security loopholes in conventional quantum
cryptography [20]. Apart from the example demonstrat-
ed in this paper, the entanglement access network may
allow realization of a number of secure multi-party com-
putation problems [13]. The entanglement shared in the
network could also find applications for certified genera-
tion of random numbers [21] and for implementation of
distributed quantum computation and multiparty quan-
tum cryptography protocols [1, 3].
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